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1. Game theory and classical economics.
Game theory is a theory of strategic interaction. That is to say, it is a theory of
rational behavior in social situations in which each player has to choose his
moves on the basis of what he thinks the other players’ countermoves are like-
ly to be.
After preliminary work by a number of other distinguished mathematici-
ans and economists, game theory as a systematic theory started with von
Neumann and Morgenstern’s book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior,
published in 1944. One source of their theory was reflection on games of stra-
tegy such as chess and poker. But it was meant to help us in defining rational
behavior also in real-life economic, political, and other social situations.
In principle, every social situation involves strategic interaction among the
participants. Thus, one might argue that proper understanding of any social
situation would require game-theoretic analysis. But in actual fact, classical
economic theory did manage to sidestep the game-theoretic aspects of eco-
nomic behavior by postulating perfect competition, i.e., by assuming that every
buyer and every seller is very small as compared with the size of the relevant
markets, so that nobody can significantly affect the existing market prices by
his actions. Accordingly, for each economic agent, the prices at which he can
buy his inputs (including labor) and at which he can sell his outputs are
essentially given  to him. This will make his choice of inputs and of outputs
into a one-person  simple maximization problem, which can be solved without
game-theoretic analysis.
Yet, von Neumann and Morgenstern realized that, for most parts of the
economic system, perfect competition would now be an unrealistic assump-
tion. Most industries are now dominated by a small number of large firms, and
labor is often organized in large labor unions. Moreover, the central govern-
ment and many other government agencies are major players in many mar-
kets as buyers and sometimes also as sellers, as regulators, and as taxing and
subsidizing agents. This means that game theory has now definitely become
an important analytical tool in understanding the operation of our econo-
mic system.
2. The problem of incomplete information.
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between games with complete information, here often to be called C-games, and
games  with incomplete information, to be called I-games. The latter differ from
the former in the fact that the players, or at least some of them, lack full infor-
mation about the basic mathematical structure of the game as defined by its nor-
mal form (or by its extensive form).
Yet, even though von Neumann and Morgenstern did distinguish between
what I am calling C-games and I-games, their own theory (and virtually all
work in game theory until the late 1960s) was restricted to C-games.
Lack of information about the mathematical structure of a game may take
many different forms. The players may lack full information about the other
players’ (or even their own) payoff functions, about the physical or the soci-
al resources or about the strategies available to other players (or even to
them themselves), or about the amount of information the other players
have about various aspects of the game, and so on.
Yet, by suitable modelling, all forms of incomplete information can be
reduced to the case where the players have less than full information about
each other’s payoff functions1 U,, defining the utility payoff u, = U,(s) of each
player i for any possible strategy combination s = (sl,. .,sJ the n players may
use.
TWO-PERSON I-GAMES
3. A model based on higher and higher-order expectations.
Consider a two-person I-game G in which the two players do not know each
other’s payoff functions. (But for the sake of simplicity I shall assume that they
do know their own payoff functions.)
A very natural - yet as we shall see a rather impractical - model for analysis
of this game would be as follows. Player 1 will realize that player 2’s strategy
s2 in this game will depend on player 2’s own payoff function U2 Therefore,
before choosing his own strategy s1 , player 1 will form some expectation el U,
about the nature of U2. By the same token, player 2 will form some expecta-
tion %U, about the nature of player l’s payoff function U1, These two expec-
tations er U, and e, U, I shall call the two players’ first-order expectations.
Then, player 1 will form some second-order expectation el%U, about player
2’s first-order expectation +U, whereas player 2 will form some second-order
expectation qe, U, about player l’s first-order expectation el U, and so on.
Of course, if the two players want to follow the Bayesian approach then their
expectations will take the form of subjective probability distributions over the
relevant mathematical objects. Thus, player l’s first order expectation e, U, will
take the form of a subjective probability distribution PI t (U2) over all possible
payoff functions U2 that player 2 may possess. Likewise, player 2’s first-order
expectation qU, will take the form of a subjective probability distribution
P21(Ul) over all possible payoff functions U1 that player 1 may possess.
On the other hand, player 1’s second-order expectation  e,%U, will take the138 Economic Sciences 1994
form of a subjective probability distribution P,y(P21) over all possible first-
order probability distributions P2 I that player 2 may entertain. More gene-
rally, the kth-order expectation (k>1) of either player i will be a subjective
probability distribution P,“(P,‘~l) over all the (k’- 1 )-order subjective probabi-
lity distributions fJ,‘c-l that the other player j (j # i) may have chosen.2
Of course, any model based on higher and higher-order expectations
would be even more complicated in the case of W@XWZ  I-games (with n > 2).
Even if we retain the simplifying assumption that each player will know his
own payoff function, even then each player will still have to form (n - 1) dif-
ferent first-order  expectations, as well as (n - 1) 
2 different second-order  expec-
tations, and so on.
Yet, as we shall see, there is a much simpler and very much preferable ap-
proach to analyzing I-games, one involving only one  basic probability distri-
bution Pr (together with n different conditional probability distributions, all
of them generated by this basic probability distribution Pr).
4. Arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the
1960s.
In the period 1965 - 69, the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
employed a group of about ten young game theorists  as consultants. It was as
a member of this group that I developed the simpler approach, already men-
tioned, to the analysis of  I-games.
I realized that a major problem in arms control negotiations is the fact that
each side is relatively well informed about its own position with respect to various
variables relevant to arms control negotiations, such as its own policy objec-
tives, its peaceful or bellicose attitudes toward the other side, its military
strength, its own ability to introduce new military technologies, and so on
- but may be rather poorly informed about the other side's position in terms of
such variables.
I came to the conclusion that finding a suitable mathematical representa-
tion for this particular problem may very well be a crucial key to a better the-
ory of arms control negotiations, and indeed to a better theory of all I-games.
Similar problems arise also in economic competition and in many other
social activities. For example, business firms are almost always better infor-
med about the economic variables associated with their own operations than
they are about those associated with their competitors’  operations.
Let me now go back to my discussion of arms control negotiations. I shall
describe the American side as player I, and shall describe the Soviet side, which
I shall often call the Russian side, as player 2.
To model the uncertainty of the Russian player about the true nature of the
American player; i.e., about that of player I, I shall assume that there are K dif-
ferent possible types of player 1, to be called types t, I, t,2,. . ., t,k,. . ., tlK. The
Russian player, i.e., player 2, will not know which particular type of player 1 will
actually be representing the American side in the game.
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own strategical possibilities in the game will obviously depend, often very
strongly, on which particular  type of the American player will confront him in
the game. For each of the K possible types of this player might correspond
to a very different combination of the possible characteristics of the American
player - in terms of variables ranging from the true intentions of this
American player to the availability or unavailability of powerful new military
technologies to him, technologies sometimes very contrary to the Russian
side’s expectations. Moreover, different types of the American player might
differ from each other also in entertaining different expectations about the
true nature of the Russian player.
On the other hand, to model the uncertainty of the American player about
the true nature of the Russian player i.e., about that of player 2, I shall assume
that there are M different possible types of player 2, to be called types
q,lp,...,em,.. .,EAM. The American player, i.e., player 1, will not know which
particular type of player 2 will actually represent the Russian side in the game.
Again, this fact will pose a serious problem for the American player because
each of the M possible types of the Russian player might correspond to a very
different combination of the possible characteristics of the Russian player.
Moreover, different types of the Russian player might differ from each other
also in entertaining different expectations about the true nature of the
American player.
3
5. A type-centered interpretation  of I-games.
A C-game is of course always analyzed on the assumption that the centers of
activity in the game are its players. But in the case of an I-game we have a choice
between two alternative assumptions. One is that its centers of activity are its
players, as would be the case in a C-game. The other is that its centers of acti-
vity are the various types of its players. The former approach I shall call a play-
er-centered interpretation of this I-game, whereas the latter approach I shall
call its type-centered interpretation.
When these two interpretations of any I-game are properly used, then they
are always equivalent from a game-theoretic point of view. In my 1967 - 68
paper I used the player-centered interpretation of I-games. But in this paper I
shall use their type-centered interpretation because now I think that it provides
a more convenient language for the analysis of I-games.
Under this latter interpretation, when player 1 is of type t,k, then the stra-
tegy and the payoff of player 1 will be described as the strategy and the payoff
of this type t,k of player 1 rather than as those of player 1 as such. This lang-
uage has the advantage that it enables us to make certain statements about
type t,k without any need for further qualifications, instead of making similar
statements about player I and then explaining that these statements apply to
him only when he is of type t,k. This language is for us also a useful reminder
of the fact that in any I-game the strategy that a given player will use and the
payoff he will receive will often strongly depend on whether this player is of one
type or is of another type.140 Economic Sciences 1994
and
(2)
7. Who will know what in the game.
In terms of type-centered language, these assumptions amount to saying that
all types of both players will know that they are active types if they in fact are.John C. Harsanyi 141
Moreover, they will know their own identities. (Thus, e.g., type t,3 will know that
he is t,S, etc.) In contrast, none of the types of player 1 will know the identity
of player 2’s active type tlm; and none of the types of player 2 will know the iden-
tity of player 1 ‘s active type t, k.
8. Two important distinctions.
As we have already seen, one important distinction in game theory is that
between games with complete and with incomplete information, i.e., between C-
games and I-games. It is based on the amount of information the players will
have in various games about the basic mathematical structure of the game as
defined by its normal form (or by its extensive form). That is to say, it is based
on the amount of information the players will have about those characteris-
tics of the game that must have been decided upon before the game can be
played at all.
Thus, in C-games all players will have full information about the basic math-
ematical structure of the game as just defined. In contrast, in I-games the
players, or at least some of them, will have only partial information about it.
Another, seemingly similar but actually quite different, distinction is bet-
ween games with perfect and with imperfect information. Unlike the first dis-
tinction, this one is based on the amount of information the players will have
in various games about the moves that occurred at earlier stages of the game,
i.e., about some events that occurred during the time when the game was
actually played, rather than about some things decided upon before that par-
ticular time.
Thus, in games with perfect information, all players will have full informa-
tion at every stage of the game about all moves made at earlier stages, inclu-
ding both personal moues and chance moves. 
4 
  In contrast, in games with imper-
fect information, at some stage(s) of the game the players, or at least some of
them, will have only partial information or none at all about some move(s)
made at earlier stages.
In terms of this distinction, chess and checkers are games with perfect infor-
mation because they do permit both players to observe not only their own
moves but also those of the other player.
In contrast, most card games are games with imperfect information becau-
se they do not permit the players to observe the cards the other players have
received from the dealer, or to observe the cards discarded by other players
with their faces down, etc.
Game theory as first established by von Neumann and Morgenstern, and
even as it had been further developed up to the late 1960s was restricted to
games with complete information. But from its very beginning, it has covered
all games in that class, regardless of whether they were games with perfect or
with imperfect information.
9. A probabilistic model for our two-person I-game G.
Up till now I have always considered the actual types of the two players, repre-142 Economic Sciences 1994
sented by the active pair (t, k, tJm) simply as given . But now I shall propose to
enrich our model for this game by adding some suitable formal representa-
tion of the causal factors responsible for the fact that the American and the
Russian player have characteristics corresponding to those of (say) types tIk
and t2* in our model.
Obviously, these causal factors can only be social forces of various kinds,
some of them located in the United States, others in the Soviet Union, and
others again presumably in the rest of the world.
Yet, it is our common experience as human beings that the results of soci-
al forces seem to admit only of probabilistic predictions. This appears to be the
case even in situations in which we are exceptionally well informed about the
relevant social forces: Even in such situations the best we can do is to make
probabilistic predictions about the results that these social forces may
produce.
Accordingly, I shall use a random mechanism and, more particularly, a lot-
tery as a formal representation of the reluctant social forces, i.e., of the social for-
ces that have produced an American society of one particular type (corres-
ponding to some type t,k of our model), and that have also produced a
Russian society of another particular type (corresponding to some type ~~~~ of
our model).
More specifically, I shall assume that, before any other moves are made in game
G, some lottery, to be called lottery L, will choose some type t,k as the type of
the American player, as well as some type k1* as the type of the Russian play-
er. I shall assume also that the probability that any particular pair (t,k,t2*) is
chosen by this lottery L will be
As player 1 has K different possible types whereas player 2 has M different
possible types, lottery L will have a choice among H = KM different pairs of
the form ( t,k,t2m).  Thus, to characterize its choice behavior we shall need H
different probabilities p,,.
Of course, all these H probabilities will be nonnegative and will add up to
unity. Moreover, they will form a K x M probability matrix [p,,], such that, for
all possible values of k and of m, its kth row will correspond to type t, k of play-
er 1 whereas its mth column will correspond to type t2* of player 2.
I shall assume also that the two players will try to estimate these H pro-
babilities on the basis of their information about the nature of the relevant
social forces, using only information available to both of them. In fact, they will
try to estimate these probabilities as an outside observer  would do, one restric-
ted to information common to both players (cf. Harsanyi, 1967 - 68, pp.
176 - 177). Moreover, I shall assume that, unless he has information to the
contrary, each player will act on the assumption that the other player will esti-
mate these probabilities pkl,t much in the same way as he does. This is often cal-
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Alternatively, we may simply assume that both players will act on the assump-
tion that both of them know the true numerical values of these probabilities
p,,,, - so that the common priors assumption will follow as a corollary.
The mathematical model we obtain when we add a lottery L (as just descri-
bed) to the two-person I-game described in sections 4 to 7 will be called a pro-
babilistic model for this I-game G. As we shall see presently, this probabilistic
model will actually convert this I-game G into a C-game, which we shall call the
game G*.
10. Converting our I-game G with incomplete information into a game G* with
complete yet with imperfect information.
In this section, I shall be using player-centered language because this is the
language in which our traditional definitions have been stated for games
with complete and with incomplete information as well as for games with
perfect and with imperfect information.
Let us go back to the two-person game G we have used to model arms con-
trol negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We are
now in a better position to understand why it is that, under our original
assumptions about G, it will be a game with incomplete information.
(i) First of all, under our original assumptions, player 1 is of type t,k, which
I shall describe as Fact I, whereas player 2 is of type tim, which I shall descri-
be as Fact II. Moreover, both Facts I and II are established facts from the very
beginning of the game, and they are not facts brought about by some move(s)
made during the game. Consequently, these two facts must be considered to
be parts of the basic mathematical structure of this game G.
(ii) On the other hand, according to the assumptions we made in section
7, player 1 will know Fact I but will lack any knowledge of Fact II. In contrast,
player 2 will know Fact II but will lack any knowledge of Fact I.
Yet, as we have just concluded, both Facts I and II are parts of the basic
mathematical structure of the game. Hence, neither player 1 nor player 2 will
have full information about this structure. Therefore, under our original
assumptions, G is in fact a game with incomplete information.
Let me now show that as soon as we reinterpret game G in accordance with
our probabilistic model, i.e., as soon as we add lottery L to the game, our origi-
nal game G will be converted into a new game G* with complete information.
Of course, even after this reinterpretation, our statements under (ii) will
retain their validity. But the status of Facts I and II as stated under (i) will
undergo a radical change. For these two Facts will now become the results of
a chance move made by lottery L during the game and, therefore, will no long-
er be parts of the basic mathematical structure of the game. Consequently,
the fact that neither player will know both of these two Facts will no longer
make the new game G* into one with incomplete information.
To the contrary, the new game G* will be one with complete information
because its basic mathematical structure will be defined by our probabilistic
model for the game, which will be fully known to both players.144 Economic Sciences 1994
On the other hand, as our statements under (ii) do retain their validity even
in game G*, the latter will be a game with imperfect information because both
players will have only partial information about the pair ( t, k,r+7rh)  chosen by the
chance move of lottery L at the beginning of the game.
11. Some conditional probabilities in game G*.
Suppose that lottery L has chosen type t,k to represent player 1 in the game.
Then, according to our assumptions in section 7, type tIk will know that he
now has the status of an active type and will know that he is type t,k. But he will
not know the identity of the other active type in the game.
On the other hand, now suppose that lottery L has chosen type 4” to repre-
sent player 2 in the game. Then, how should G* assess the probability that the
other active type is a particular type tl k of player l? By similar reasoning, he
should assess this probability as being the conditional probability
12. The semi-conditional payoff func t ions of the two active types.
Suppose the two active types in the game are t,k and tJ”. As we saw in section
6, under this assumption, the payoffs vlk and u?* of these two active types will
be defined by equations (1) and (2).
Note, however, that this payoff ut k defined by (1) will not be the quantity
that type t,” will try to maximize when he chooses his strategy slk. For he will
not know that his actual opponent in the game will be type &>“. Rather, all he
will know is that his opponent in the game will be one of player 2’s M types.
Therefore, he will choose his strategy s,k so as to protect his interests not only
against his unknown actual opponent &j * but rather against all M types of
player 2 because, for all he knows, any of them could be now his opponent in
the game.
Yet, type tlk will know that the probability that he will face any particular type
kl* as opponent in the game will be equal to the conditional probability
n,k( m)defined  by (4). Therefore, the quantity that t1
k will try to maximize is
the expected value u,k of the payoff IJ,~ which can be defined as
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Here the symbol s2* stands for the strategy M-tuple
6
(8)
Here the symbol s1* stands for the strategy K-tuple
In contrast, U,
 k and Ujm define the expected payoff u,k or aLm of the relevant
type as being independent of condition (b) yet as being dependent on condition
(a). (For it will still be true that neither type will receive any payoff at all if he
is not given by lottery L the status of an active type in the game.)
As we saw in section 10, once we reinterpret our original I-game G in
accordance with our probabilistic model for it, G will be converted into a C-
game G*. Yet, under its type-centered interpretation, this C-game G* can be
regarded as a (K+M)-person game whose real “players” are the K types of play-
er 1 and the M types of player 2, with their basic payoff functions being the
semi-conditional payoff functions U,k(k=l,.  . .,K) and l,$,m( ml,. . .,M).
If we regard these (K+M) types as the real “players” of G* and regard these
payoff functions U,k and Uj* as their real payoff functions, then we can easi-
ly define the Nash equilibria7 of this C-game G*. Then, using a suitable theo-146 Economic Sciences 1994
ry of equilibrium selection, we can define one of these equilibria as the solu-
tion of this game.
N-PERSON I-GAMES
13. The types of the various players, the active set, and the appropriate sets in n-person
I-game.5
Our analysis of two-person I-games can be easily extended to n-person I-
games. But for lack of space I shall have to restrict myself to the basic essen-
tials of the n-person theory.
Let N be the set of all n players. I shall assume that any player i (i=1,...,n)
will have K, different possible types, to be called t,‘,..., t,k ,..., t?Kz. Hence, the
total number  of different types in the game will be
Any set of n types containing exactly one  type of each of the n players could
in principle play the role of an active set. Any such set will be called an appro-
priate set. As any player i has 6 different types, the number of different appro-
priate sets in the game will be
(11)
I shall assume that these H appropriate sets a will have been numbered as
(12)
Let A,k be the family of all appropriate sets containing a particular type t) of
some player i as their member The number of different appropriate sets in A,k
will be
Let Bzk be the set of all subscripts h such that ah is in A,k. As there is a one-to-
one correspondence between the members of Aik and the members of Bjk,
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14. Some probabilities.
I shall assume that, before any other moues are made in game G*, some lottery L
will choose one particular appropriate set a to be the active set r;C of the game.
The n types in this set Z will be called active types whereas all types not in Z will
be called inactive types.
I shall assume that the probability that a particular appropriate set ah will be
chosen by lottery L to be the active set Z of the game is
(14)
Of course, all these H probabilities rh will be nonnegative and will add up to
unity. Obviously, they will correspond to the H probabilities pkm [defined by
(3)] we used in the two-person case.
Suppose that a particular type t: of some player i has been chosen by lot-
tery L to be an active type in the game. Then, under our assumptions, he will
know that he is type t,k and will know also that he now has the status of an acti-
ve type. In other words, ttk will know that
and conversely, because Ark contains exactly those appropriate sets that have
type tik as their member: Thus, we can write
We have already concluded that if type tlk has the status of an active type  then
he will know (15). We can now add that in this case he will know also (16)
and ( 17). On the other hand, he can also easily compute that the probability
for lottery L to choose an active set Z belonging to the family A,k is
(18)
In view of statements (15) to (18), how should this type t,k assess the probabi-
lity that the active set (G chosen by lottery L is actually a particular appropria-
te set a,? Clearly, he should assess this probability as being the conditional pro-
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(19)
Yet, in view of (17) and (18), we can write
(20)
Consequently, by (19) and (20) the required conditional probability is
(21)
15. Strategy profiles.
Suppose that the K, types tt ,..., t,” ,..., tzKi of player i would use the strategies
1 si ,...) Sk 1 ,. . . ,s,Q (pure or mixed) in case they were chosen by lottery L to be acti-
ve types in the game. (Under our assumptions, inactive types do not actively
participate in the game and, therefore, do not choose any strategies.) Then I
shall write
(22)
to denote the strategy profile
8 of the Ki types of player i.
Let
be the ordered set we obtain if we first list all K1 strategies in s1*, then all K2
strategies in s2*, . . . , then all K1 strategies in si*,. , and finally all Kn strategies
in s,*. Obviously, s* will be a strategy profile of all types in the game. In view of
(10), s* will contain Z different strategies.
Finally, let s*(h) denote the strategy profile of the n types belonging to a par-
ticular appropriate set ah for h = 1,. . , H.
16. The conditional payoff functions.
Let ah be an appropriate set defined as
The characteristic vector c(h) for ah will be defined as the n-vector
Suppose that this set ah has been chosen by lottery L to be the active set 5of
the game, and that some particular type tzk of player i has been chosen byJohn C. Harsanyi 149
lottery L to be an active type. This of course means that tt must be a member of
this set ah, which can be the case only if type t,k is identical to type t$ listed in
(24), which implies that we must have k=k,
Yet, if all these requirements are met, then this set ah and this type tzk toget-
her will satisfy all the statements (14) to (21).
As we saw in section 6, the payoff v,k of any active type tik will depend both
1. On the strategies used by the n active types in the game, and
2. On the identities of these active types.
This means, however, that t,k,s payoff v,k will depend on the strategy profile s*(h)
defined in the last paragraph of section 15, and on the characteristic vector c(h)
defined by (25).
Thus, we can write
(26)
Secondly, even if t,k is chosen to be an active type, (26) makes his payoff v,k
dependent on the set a,, chosen by lottery L to be an active set Cof the game.
17. Semi-conditional payoff functions.
By reasoning similar to that we used in section 12, one can show that the
quantity any active type t,k will try to maximize will not be his payoff u,k defi-
ned by (26). Rather, it will be his expected payoff; i.e., the expected value u,k of
his payoff u,k.
We can define urk as
(27)
It is true also in the n-person case that if an I-game is reinterpreted in
accordance with our probabilistic model then it will be converted into a C-game
G*.
Moreover, this C-game G*, under its type-centered interpretation, can be
regarded as a Z-person game whose “players” are the Z different types in the150 Economic Sciences 1994
game. As the payoff function of each type t> we can use his semi-conditional
payoff function U;.
Using these payoff functions lJt, it will be easy to define the Nash equilibria
(Nash, 1951) of this Z-person game, and to choose one of them as its solution
on the basis of a suitable theory of equilibrium selection.
1 See Harsanyi, 1967-68 (pp. 167- 168).
2 The subjective probability distributions of various orders discussed in this section all are
probability distributions over function spaces, whose proper mathematical definition
poses some well - known technical difficulties. Yet, as Aumann (1963 and 1964) has
shown, these difficulties can be overcome. But even so, the above model of higher and
higher-order subjective probability distributions remains a hopelessly cumbersome
model for analysis of I-games.
3 Let z,,“(m) for m =l,...,M be the probability that some type t,k of player 1 assigns to the
assumption that the Russian side will be represented by type t?” in the game. According
to Bayesian theory, the M probabilities n:(l), n,a(2),...n,“(m)....,~F(M)  will fully charac-
terize the expectations that this type  t,k entertains about the characteristics of player 2 in
the game. On the other hand, as we shall see, the probabilistic   model we shall propose for
the game will imply that these probabilities   p1
k(m) must be equal to certain conditional
probabilities so that
A similar relationship will obtain between the K [probabilities n**(k) entertained by any
given type t2” of player 2 and the conditional probabilities  Pr (t,“l&,“) for k =l,...,K.
4 Personal moves are moves the various players   have chosen to make. Chance moves are moves
made by some chance mechanism, such as a roulette wheel. Yet, moves made by some play-
ers yet decided by chance, such as throwing a coin, or a shuffling of cards, can also count
as chance moves.
5 Cf. footnote 3 to section 4 above.
6 Using player-centered language, in Harsanyi (1967-68, p. 180), I called the M-tuple s 2*
and the K-tuple s1* (see below), the normalized strategies of player 2 and player 1, respec-
tively.
7 As defined by John Nash in Nash (1951). But he actually called them equilibrium points.
8 In Harsanyi, 1967-68, I called a strategy combination such as S&* the normalized strategy
of player i (cf. Footnote 6 to section 12 above).
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